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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
13137 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant, David Craig Carlsen, appeals from his con-
viction of attempted second degree burglary in the First 
Judicial District Court of the County of Cache, State of 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On the 25th day of September, 1972, appellant was 
brought to a jury trial for the crime of attempted bur-
glary of which the jury rendered a verdict of guilty. The 
court, on the 26th day of September, 1972, imposed judg-
ment and sentence and a commitment was issued order-
ing appellant to be confined in the Utah State Prison for 
a term of not less than six months nor more than ten 
years. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the 
First Judicial District Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 11th day of April, 1972, the appellant, while 
on parole from the Utah State Prison, was observed, along 
with one other person, purchasing burglary tools from the 
Grand Central Store in Logan, Utah. That night the 
appellant and his companion were surprised while trying 
to break into the Rexall Drug Store in Richmond, Utah, 
by two police officers. The appellant then fled on foot, 
but not before being recognized by one of the officers who 
had known him for a number of years previously (T. 31-
32). The appellant eluded the officers, but his companion 
was apprehended. The appellant was arrested the next 
day in Logan, Utah. 
An information was filed in the District Court on the 
5th day of June. At a hearing on August 17, appellant's 
counsel requested a trial date in the latter part of Sep-
tember. Trial was held on the 25th and 26th of Septem-
ber, and the jury rendered a verdict of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
BEYOND NINETY DAYS FROM THE FIL-
ING OF AN INFORMATION AND DID NOT 
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ERR IN CONVICTING AND SENTENCING 
APPELLANT, IN THAT PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 77-65-1 (SUPP. 
1971), THE COURT GRANTED A NECES-
SARY AND REASONABLE CONTINUANCE 
FOR GOOD CAUSE. 
The issue in case at bar falls within the Utah De-
tainer Act which provides in part: 
"Whenever a person has entered upon a term 
of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institu-
tion of this state, and whenever during the con-
tinuance of the term of imprisonment there is 
pending in this state any untried indictment, in-
formation or complaint against the prisoner, he 
shall be brought to trial within ninety days after 
he shall have caused to be delivered to the county 
attorney of the county in which the indictment, 
information or complaint is pending and the ap-
propriate court written notice of the place of his 
imprisonment and his request for a final disposi-
tion to be made of the indictment, information or 
complaint: provided, that for a good cause shown 
in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being 
present, the court having jurisdiction of the mat-
ter may grant any necessary or reasonable con-
tinuance . . ." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 77-65-1 (a) 
(Supp. 1971). (Emphasis added.) 
This court in interpreting this statute stated, "We 
think the State has ninety days from notice after an in-
formation or indictment has been filed in which to bring 
the defendant to trial in a felony case." State v. Clark, 
28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P. 2d 274 (1972). 
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In the present case, the information was filed on the 
5th day of June. The following conversation between 
appellant's attorney and the trial judge at a hearing held 
August 17th (within the 90 day period) explains why the 
trial was held beyond the 90 day period. 
THE COURT: All right, then I can set it for 
September 14th and 15th. Does that give you 
enough time to treat those motions, do you think? 
MR. LONG: Well, it probably would, your 
Honor, except for the fact that I don't plan to be 
here during the month of September. I don't plan 
to be anywhere in Utah during that month, al-
though it may happen that I am. Is it possible 
to set it later in the month of September? I mean 
if it is close to the first of October and still in 
September, I can come back a little early to do 
that. If it is set in say the next couple of weeks, 
I will be hard put to prepare my motions. 
THE COURT: What you are asking is some-
thing in the last two weeks in September? 
MR. LONG: Yes. 
In a case whose facts are very similar to the cir-
cumstances presented here, this court stated, 
"It was at the request of, and in order to ac-
commodate the defendant's counsel, (with the de-
fendant at his side) that he not be forced to trial 
on the 28th when he had another commitment, 
that the trial court indicated a setting for Febru-
ary 9th, just five days beyond the 90 day period, 
which was agreed to by the defense inasmuch as 
this occurrence took place within the 90 day per-
iod, the court certainly then had jurisdiction of 
the matter in which the statute says that it 'may 
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grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.' 
The order made was within the authority of the 
court, and was entirely reasonable and practical 
under the circumstances/' State v. Bonny, 25 
Utah 2d 117, 477 P. 2d 147 (1970). 
In the present case the alleged delay beyond the 90 
day period was also due to an effort by the trial court to 
accommodate defendant's counsel. As shown by the con-
versation recorded at the August 17th hearing, appellant's 
counsel was "hard put" to prepare his motions within the 
90 day period and he therefore asked for a trial date in 
the last two weeks of September. 
At the time of the August 17th hearing the trial court 
did have jurisdiction of the matter and for good cause 
shown in open court granted a reasonable continuance. 
The purpose of the statute is "to more precisely de-
fine what is meant by 'speedy trial' as that term is used 
in the constitutions of the various states." State v. Wil-
son, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P. 2d 158 (1969). 
The United States Supreme Court: 
". . . has consistently been of the view that 'the 
right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is 
consistent with delays and depends upon circum-
stances. It secures rights to a defendant. I t does 
not preclude the rights of public justice.' (citation 
omitted.) 'Whether delay in completing a prose-
cution . . . amounts to an unconstitutional depri-
vation of rights depends ^upon the circumstances 
. . . The delay must not be purposeful or oppres-
sive.' (citation omitted.) ' (T) he essential ingred-
ient is orderly expedition and not mere speed.'" 
United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 120 (1966). 
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The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court 
concerning speedy trial may be applied to the case at bar. 
Circumstances justified continuance; appellant's counsel 
was unable to prepare his motions within the 90 day per-
iod nor even 11 days after this period had expired. Much 
of the delay during the 90 day period was caused by the 
actions of the appellant. Numerous motions were filed 
by the appellant which took time to be heard and which 
necessitated the trial court in getting another judge to 
determine the matters set out in these motions and to 
try the case (T. 7). Arraignment of the appellant had 
to be postponed at his own request resulting in further 
delay (R. 34). 
Due to these actions and at the request of appellant's 
counsel, the trial was justifiably held beyond the 90 day 
period. No rights of appellant were prejudiced. The de-
lay was not purposeful or oppressive. There was orderly 
expedition. The facts fall well within the constitutional 
standard of right to a speedy trial, the Utah statute, and 
do not fall contrary to Utah case law. The respondent 
submits that the trial court did have jurisdiction at the 
time it passed judgment and the conviction of the appel-
lant should, therefore, be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
THE RECORD IN THE PRESENT CASE 
PRESENTS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
S U P P O R T THE CONVICTION OF THE 
APPELLANT. 
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Counsel for the appellant contends that the prosecu-
tion did not carry its burden of proof in showing intent on 
the part of the appellant. As this court pointed out in 
State of Utah v. Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377, 453 P. 2d 697 
(1969), a person is presumed to intend the natural and 
probable consequences of his acts. 
Appellant would contend that the prosecution must 
show by absolute proof that appellant had specific intent 
to commit larceny. Such a burden is not required. This 
court stated in State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P. 
2d 486 (1961). 
"Even though there was no direct proof that 
defendant entered an apartment with intent to 
commit larceny, evidence that he entered the 
apartment by a ladder at night and fled when 
police officers arrived, coupled with other inculpa-
tory conduct, provided ample proof to support con-
viction." 
In the present case, evidence was presented that the 
appellant was attempting to forcibly enter the Rexall 
Drug Store at night. When the police officers arrived, the 
appellant fled on foot, after being recognized. Another 
suspect who was apprehended at that time was seen 
earlier in the day with the appellant purchasing tools of 
the type used in the attempted break-in. The jury chose 
to believe the evidence presented by the prosecution 
which was definitely sufficient to support a conviction. 
The respondent submits that no error was committed 
by the trial court in not directing a verdict for the appel-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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lant or in not directing a verdict to a lesser and lower 
degree of the crime. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS AS TO THE 
A L L E G E D ADMISSION OF IMPROPER 
EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE REVIEWED 
INASMUCH AS TIMELY OBJECTION WAS 
NOT MADE. 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that: 
"A verdict of finding shall not be set aside, nor 
shall the judgment or decision based thereon be 
reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of 
evidence unless (a) there appears of record objec-
tion to the evidence timely interposed and so 
stated as to make clear the specific ground of ob-
jection, and (b) the court which passes upon the 
effect of the error or errors is of the opinion that 
the admitted evidence should have been excluded 
on the ground stated and probably had a substan-
tial influence in bringing about the verdict or 
finding." 
In the present case, no objection was made to the 
alleged improper evidence during the course of the trial. 
I t was not until six days after the conclusion of the trial 
that appellant's counsel submitted an exception to certain 
testimony given (R. 73). 
This court stated in Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 
332 P. 2d 981 (1958): 
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"Whatever merit there may have been to this 
objection, the defendant is now precluded from 
voicing it. The testimony was elicited without 
objection. This constituted a waiver of the right 
to question its competency. And the evidence be-
ing so received could be relied upon as proof of 
the fact to which it related." 
53 Am. Jur. sec. 134, in discussing the requirement 
of timeliness, stated: 
"The time for presenting questions as to the 
applicability of evidence, both as to issues and 
parties, is at the time when the evidence is offered, 
if it is reasonably possible to present the objection 
at that time; unless such reasonable objections are 
made the party cannot as of right insist upon his 
objections by means of motions to strike out evi-
dence or requests for rulings after the close of the 
evidence." 
The appellant in case at bar did not timely object to 
the evidence offered and should therefore be precluded 
from raising these issues before this court. 
Even if timely objection had been made, the effect of 
the testimony elicited did not have a substantial influence 
in bringing about the verdict rendered and, therefore, such 
verdict should not be set aside nor the judgment based 
thereon be reversed. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
CHANGE OF VENUE. 
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It is a well settled proposition in Utah case law that 
a change of venue is within the trial court's judicial dis-
cretion and subject to review only for abuse of such dis-
cretion. In appellate review of the exercise of this discre-
tion, the appellant must satisfy the Supreme Court that 
the trial court exercised its discretion clearly against rea-
son and evidence. The respondent submits that the 
appellant has failed to show that the trial court exercised 
such abuse. State v. BeBee, 110 Utah 484, 175 P. 2d 478 
(1946); State v. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228 P. 563 (1924). 
Section 77-26-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), in prescrib-
ing an application for change of venue states that: 
"The application must be made in open court, 
and in writing supported by affidavit, and may be 
made at any time before trial upon reasonable 
notice and the service of copies of the application 
and affidavits upon the attorney for the state." 
In discussing statutes of this sort 56 Am. Jur. Sec. 
61, states that: 
"Where a reasonable previous notice of the 
application is provided for, the only fair deduction 
to be made from that provision is that the notice 
must precede the commencement of the trial." 
In the present case the attorney for appellant did 
not present his motion for Change of Venue until after 
the trial had commenced (T. 9). The appellant himself 
had presented this motion earlier but subsequently with-
drew it. The trial judge later invited the appellant's at-
torney to reassert the motion and was told that if it were 
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done it would be in advance of the trial date. When the 
motion was presented at the trial, the trial judge decided 
not to entertain it as it had not been timely brought (T. 
9-10), 
The record indicates that the appellant did not com-
ply with the statute as to reasonable notice and, there-
fore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in decid-
ing not to entertain the motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent submits that the trial court did have 
jurisdiction of the information and did not commit any 
errors which would require a reversal of the conviction 
below. The State asks that the judgment be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
WILLIAM T. EVANS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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